Research Publications

Books

B. Zorina Khan, The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in American Economic Development, 1790-1920. NBER and Cambridge University Press, 2005.                   ***Alice Hanson Jones Biennial Prize for outstanding book in American economic history.

Abstract: This book examines the nature and consequences of intellectual property rights during the “long nineteenth century.”  Britain and France adopted policies and institutions that reflected their oligarchic origins. Instead, U.S. patent and copyright institutions were carefully calibrated to “promote the general welfare.” The United States created the first modern patent system, and its policies were the most liberal in the world toward inventors. When markets expanded, these inventors contributed to the proliferation of new innovations, many of which proved to be valuable both in economic and technical terms.  Disadvantaged individuals who did not have the resources to directly exploit their inventions benefited disproportionately from the operation of efficient markets that allowed them to specialize and sell off their rights. The diversity of ideas and accumulation of such incremental efforts helped to propel the United States to the forefront of all other industrial nations. In contrast to its leadership in the area of patents, the U.S. copyright regime was among the weakest in the world, and it profited from international copyright piracy for a century. American patent and copyright institutions not only furthered economic and technological progress but also provided a conduit for the creativity and achievements of disadvantaged groups.

B. Zorina Khan, Inventing Ideas: Patents, Innovation Prizes, and the Knowledge Economy. Oxford University Press, 2020.                                                                                                                ***Alice Hanson Jones Biennial Prize for outstanding book in American economic history.

Inventing Ideas, Ch. 1: Introduction

Published and Forthcoming Articles

B. Zorina Khan, “Cliometric Approaches to Creativity: Patents, Prizes, Copyrights and Trademarks,” Handbook of Cliometrics (forthcoming 2023).

Abstract: This chapter surveys recent cliometric research on technological and cultural creativity in Europe and the United States between 1750 and 1930. Empirical analyses of patents, prizes, copyrights, and trademarks have added to our knowledge of the sources and nature of inventive activity and cultural innovation, and their impact on economic growth. Far more attention has been directed towards the relationship between patents and technological change, resulting in more robust findings. In the U.S., property rights in patented inventions facilitated markets in ideas, and ensured that returns were aligned with productivity and market demand. European growth models assumed useful knowledge was scarce, and an array of rights and rewards were directed to elites and “great inventions.” Nonmarket-oriented incentives such as innovation prizes typically failed as inducements for inventive activity, and were associated with rent-seeking and governance problems. An increasing number of studies examine copyrights and trademarks, but their general results are less conclusive, suggesting a need for more empirical attention to cultural markets. This extensive body of research underlines that quantitative analysis is only as good as the underlying data, that credible conclusions require close attention to variation in institutional details, and that excellence in cliometrics involves both good economics and good history.

B. Zorina Khan, “Related Investing: Kinship Networks, Gender, and Corporate Shareholding in Antebellum New England,” Business History Review vol. 96 (3) 2022: 487-524.

Abstract: Research into the organization of the firm typically contrasts family businesses with impersonal corporate structures, and kinship ties among corporate elites are often associated with inefficiency and corruption. This analysis of over 14,000 equity investors and executive officers finds that familial networks were embedded in early corporations, not just among directors but also among small shareholders in the firm. Related investing was especially prominent among women and other relatively disadvantaged groups. Personal ties in newer, riskier enterprises encouraged capital mobilization in emerging ventures and persistence in shareholding, and related investing was significantly associated with lower risk of corporate bank failures. The results support a more positive view of family networks in business organizations and in overall economic development.

B. Zorina Khan, “National Innovation Policies in Britain, France and the United States, 1750-1930,” in Stephen Haber and Naomi Lamoreaux, eds., The Battle over Patents, OUP (2021).

B. Zorina Khan, “Review of Nevins Prize Dissertations,” Journal of Economic History (June, 2021).

B. Zorina Khan, “Accounting for Creativity: Lessons from the Economic History of Intellectual Property and Innovation,” Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, vol 17 (1) 2020: 1-37.

Abstract: Social progress depends on the realization of inventive ideas, and economic history provides valuable lessons about creativity in technology and culture. The empirical study of over one hundred thousand innovative individuals who obtained patents, copyrights, and prizes, sheds light on the relationship between institutions, incentives, and transformative ideas and expression, over the past two centuries. The European growth model assumed useful knowledge was scarce, and top-down administered innovation systems offered rights and rewards to “exclusive” groups. By contrast, American policies regarded creativity as widely distributed in the general population, and further promoted “inclusive” market oriented mechanisms that fostered diversity in ideas and outcomes. The evidence suggests that property rights in patents facilitated markets in ideas, and ensured that returns were aligned with productivity and market demand. Whereas, such administered systems as innovation prizes and publisher’s copyrights in the “creative industries” benefited the few rather than overall social welfare.

B. Zorina Khan, “One for All? Intellectual Property Laws and Developing Countries in Historical Perspective,” in Graeme Gooday and Steven Wilf, eds., Patent Cultures: Global Diversity and Harmonization in Historical Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2020: 69-88.

B. Zorina Khan, “Intellectual Property and Economic Development: Lessons from American and European History,” in Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property and Economic Development, Elgar, 2019.

Abstract: The relationship between intellectual property rights and economic development has attracted a great deal of attention from economists, but their conclusions have been ambivalent and offer little definitive guidance for policy makers. My paper explores the economic history of patents and copyrights in the United States, Europe and Japan, and highlights the lessons that are relevant to the experience of developing countries today. The study offers policy options regarding key issues in national intellectual property regimes and legislation, the broader policy framework, and the international arena.

B. Zorina Khan, “The Real History of Intellectual Piracy in America,” Foreign Affairs, January 2019.

B. Zorina Khan, “Human capital, knowledge and economic development: evidence from the British Industrial Revolution, 1750–1930,” Cliometrica, 12(2) 2018: 313-341.

Abstract: Endogenous growth models raise fundamental questions about the nature of human creativity, and the sorts of resources, skills, and knowledge inputs that shift the frontier of technology and production possibilities. Many argue that the experience of early British industrialization supports the thesis that economic advances depend on specialized scientific training, the acquisition of costly human capital, and the role of elites. This paper examines the contributions of different types of knowledge to industrialization, by assessing the backgrounds, education and inventive activity of major contributors to technological advances in Britain during the crucial period between 1750 and 1930. The results indicate that scientists, engineers or technicians were not well-represented among the cadre of important British inventors, and their contributions remained unspecialized until very late in the nineteenth century. The informal institution of apprenticeship and learning on the job provided effective means to enable productivity and innovation. For developing countries today, the implications are that costly investments in specialized human capital resources might be less important than incentives for creativity, flexibility, and the ability to make incremental adjustments that can transform existing technologies into inventions and innovations that are appropriate for prevailing domestic conditions.

B. Zorina Khan, “Invisible Women: Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Family Firms in Nineteenth- Century France,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 76 (1) 2016: 163-195.

Abstract: The French economy has been criticized for a lack of integration of women in business and for the prevalence of inefficient family firms. A sample drawn from patent and exhibition records is used to examine the role of women in enterprise and invention in France. Middle-class women were extensively engaged in entrepreneurship and innovation, and the empirical analysis indicates that their commercial efforts were significantly enhanced by association with family firms. Such formerly invisible achievements suggest a more productive role for family-based enterprises, as a means of incorporating relatively disadvantaged groups into the market economy as managers and entrepreneurs.

B. Zorina Khan, “Inventing Prizes: A Historical Perspective on Innovation Awards and Technology Policy,” Business History Review, vol. 89 (4) 2015: 631-660.

Abstract: Prizes for innovations are currently experiencing a renaissance, following their marked decline during the nineteenth century. Debates about such incentive mechanisms tend to employ canonical historical anecdotes to motivate and support the analysis and policy proposals. Daguerre’s “patent buyout,” the Longitude Prize, inducement prizes for butter substitutes and billiard balls, the activities of the Royal Society of Arts and other “encouragement” institutions—all comprise potentially misleading case studies. The article summarizes my extensive empirical research using samples drawn from Britain, France, and the United States, including “great inventors” and their ordinary counterparts, and prizes at industrial exhibitions. The results show that administered systems of rewards to innovators suffered from a number of disadvantages in design and practice, which are inherent to their nonmarket orientation.

B. Zorina Khan, “The Impact of War on Resource Allocation: “Creative Destruction,” Patenting, and the American Civil War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 46 (3) 2015: 315-353.

Abstract: The large exogenous shock to labor and capital markets, aggregate demand, the distribution of expenditures, and the rate and direction of technological innovation that war often causes can lead to substantial changes in the allocation of resources. Empirical evidence reveals a significant misallocation of resources during the American Civil War, as a result of reduced geographical mobility, greater incentives for individuals with high opportunity cost to switch into the market for military technologies, and decreased financial returns to inventors. However, the rapid economic recovery that ensued after the end of the war suggests that the misallocation was only temporary, not long inhibiting the capacity for future technological progress.

B. Zorina Khan, “The Social and Economic Consequences of Patent Institutions and Prizes in Technology Markets,” in D. Halbert and W. Gallagher (eds), Law and Society Perspectives on Intellectual Property, 2015.

B. Zorina Khan, “Trolls and Other Patent Inventions: Economic History and the Patent Controversy in the Twenty-First Century,” George Mason Law Review, vol. 21 (2014): 825-863.

Abstract: The most significant changes to the patent and innovation system in the past two centuries have been, or are in the process of being, implemented in the United States today. Critics of patent grants and intellectual property institutions propose alternatives such as unprecedented constraints on the rights of patent owners, and many advocate the award of technological prizes as superior alternatives. Such proposals are motivated by claims that the patent system is in crisis, with new developments that require departures from traditional approaches to property rights and technology policy. The historical record sheds light on the nature and validity of these controversies. In particular, data on patents granted, litigation rates over the past two centuries, and the role of non-practicing entities, indicate that these features of the current market in intellectual property are hardly anomalous. Indeed, they have been inherently associated with disruptive technologies that transformed the United States into the world leader in industrial and economic growth. By contrast, extensive empirical analyses of prize systems in Europe and the United States explain why early enthusiasm about such administered nonmarket-oriented awards had waned by the end of the nineteenth century.

B. Zorina Khan, “Selling Ideas: An International Perspective on Patenting and Markets for Technology, 1790-1930,” Business History Review, vol. 87 (1) 2013: 39–68.

Abstract: An extensive global market in patents and innovations developed after the middle of the nineteenth century. I employ data from the United States, Britain, Germany, Canada, New South Wales, Spain, and Japan during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to assess the evolution of transfers in patent-property rights across these countries. The empirical analysis examines the factors that affected patterns in patent assignments and foreign patenting for these countries. It sheds further light on cross-sectional variation in foreign patenting and transfers to corporations, based on a panel data set of patent grants and assignments at issue in the United States during the Second Industrial Revolution. The results indicate that, just as inventive activity responded to incentives, the patterns of market exchange in patent rights varied in accordance with legal, economic, and institutional parameters. The analysis is consistent with the position that developing countries today might benefit from tailoring their patent institutions to individual circumstances rather than adhering to harmonized standards.

B. Zorina Khan, “Going for Gold: Industrial Fairs and Innovation in the Nineteenth-Century United States,” Special Issue on Innovation without Patents, Revue Economique, vol. 64 (1) 2013: 89-114.

Abstract: This paper compares the award of prizes to innovation in the patent system. The data set comprises a sample of exhibits and premiums at industrial fairs sponsored by the Massachusetts Charitable Mechanic Association, between 1837 and 1874. The results shed light on the factors that influenced whether specific inventions and inventors attempted to appropriate returns through the protection of intellectual property rights, or through alternative institutions. Prize winners tended to belong to more privileged classes than the general population of patentees, as gauged by the wealth and occupation of inventors at the exhibition. Moreover, the award of prizes was less systematic than that of patents, and unrelated to such proxies for the productivity of the innovation as inventive capital or the commercial success of the invention.

B. Zorina Khan, “A Page of History: Patents, Prizes, and Technological Innovation,” WIPO Journal, Special Issue on Intellectual Property and History, vol. 5 (1) 2013: 17-25.

B. Zorina Khan, “Copyright Policy and Education in Economic Development,” in Ruth Okediji (ed), Exceptions and Limitations in International Copyright Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

B. Zorina Khan, “Economic History of Technological Change,” in Randall Parker and Robert Whaples (eds.), Handbook of Modern Economic History, Routledge (2012): 59-70.

B. Zorina Khan, “Antitrust and Innovation Before the Sherman Act,” Special Issue on Antitrust and Innovation, Antitrust Law Journal 77 (3) (2011): 1001-1029.

B. Zorina Khan, “Premium Inventions: Patents and Prizes as Incentive Mechanisms in Britain and the United States, 1750-1930” in D. L. Costa and N. R. Lamoreaux (eds), Understanding Long-Run Economic Growth: Geography, Institutions, and the Knowledge Economy, University of Chicago (2011): 205-234.

B. Zorina Khan, “Looking Backward: Founding Choices in Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection,” in Douglas Irwin and Richard Sylla (eds), Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s, NBER and University of Chicago (2010): 315-342.

B. Zorina Khan, “War and the Returns to Entrepreneurial Innovation among U.S. Patentees, 1790-1870,” Special Issue on the Cliometrics of Patents, Brussels Economic Review, vol. 52 (3/4) 2009: 239-274.

Abstract: Wars create dramatic changes in incentives for entrepreneurship and innovation, which need to be understood if we are to gauge the more subtle costs and benefits of armed conflict. This study examines the effect of the American Civil War on patterns of patenting and on the returns to inventive activity among patentees. The sample includes “great inventors” who achieved national eminence, patentees who created war-related inventions, all of the Confederate and Southern patentees, and a panel of over 8000 patents filed between 1790 and 1870. The empirical analysis focuses on the extent to which an entrepreneurial response to the armed conflict was associated with disproportionate changes in the wealth of inventors relative to the general population.

B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “A Tale of Two Countries: Innovation and Incentives among Great Inventors in Britain and the United States, 1750-1930,” in Roger Farmer (ed) Macroeconomics in the Small and the Large, Edward Elgar (2009): 140-156.

B. Zorina Khan, “`Justice of the Marketplace’: Legal Disputes and Economic Activity on America’s Northeastern Frontier, 1700-1860.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 39 (1) 2008: 1-35. (Lead article)

Abstract: The analysis of markets, courts, and civil litigation on the northeastern frontier of the United States provides a valuable opportunity to assess the evolution of institutions during economic development. The data set pools longitudinal and cross-sectional observations on 30,000 lawsuits filed in Maine during the critical period between 1700 and 1860. The earliest legal institutions moderated both social and economic norms, but courts quickly began to specialize in commercial issues. The residence of debtors and creditors and changes in spatial characteristics over time yield insights into the nature and extent of capital markets and impersonal exchange. The distribution and disposition of property and debt cases indicate that early markets were well developed and orderly; the evidence of “social tension” between debtors and creditors was minimal. The results do not support the standard claim of a transition from interactions based on community norms to impersonal market exchange late in the eighteenth century.

B. Zorina Khan, “Innovations in Law and Technology, 1790-1920,” in Cambridge History of Law in America, (eds) Michael Grossberg and Christopher Tomlins, New York: Cambridge University Press (vol. II, 2008): 483-530, 796-801.

Abstract: Law and technology are both critical for understanding the evolution of American society. As such prominent commentators as Thomas Paine and Alexis de Tocqueville have pointed out, U.S. policy has always been distinguished by the central role of law and the judiciary. Meanwhile, its citizens stand out for their innovativeness and willingness to adopt new technologies, to such an extent that some have even characterized the United States as a “republic of technology.” This favorable view of invention and innovation was matched by the readiness of the judiciary to accommodate the radical transformations caused by innovations. Some modern observers contend, however, that technology in the twenty-first century is so radically different from previous experience that technological change today threatens the viability of the conventional legal system as a means of regulation or mediation.

The notion that our own era is unique displays a limited appreciation of the cumulative impact of such innovations as the telegraph, steam engine, railroad, radio, hydroelectric power and commercial air travel on American society in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Unprecedented technical progress during that period brought about discrete and measurable changes in the lives, lifestyles, and livelihoods of Americans that, arguably, exceed those of our own time. Less dramatic advances in knowledge and their applications also significantly promoted social welfare. For example, the diffusion of information about hygiene and common medical technologies among households extended life expectancies and improved the standard of living. Technological innovations also affected the scope and nature of the law.

B. Zorina Khan, “La Piratería de Derechos del Autor y El Desarrollo: Evidencia de Los Estados Unidos en el Siglo XIX,” Revista de Economía Institucional vol 10, No. 18 (Jan-June), 2008:21-54. (Lead article, invited submission)

Abstract: Does the lack of international copyrights benefit or harm developing countries? This article examines the effects of U.S. copyright piracy during a period when the U.S. was a developing country. U.S. statutes protected the copyrights of American citizens from 1790, but until 1891 deemed the works of foreign citizens to be in the public domain. In 1891, the laws were changed to allow foreigners to obtain copyright protection in the United States if certain conditions were met. Thus, this episode in American history provides us with a convenient way of investigating the consequences of international copyright piracy. The analysis is based on copyright registrations, information on authors, book titles and prices, financial data from the accounts of a major publishing company, and lawsuits regarding copyright questions to investigate the welfare effects of widespread infringement of foreign works on American publishers, writers, and the public. The results suggest that the United States benefited from piracy and that the choice of copyright regime was endogenous to the level of economic development. (English translation)

B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Historical Perspectives on Patent Systems in Economic Development,” in Neil Netanel (ed), The Development Agenda: Global Intellectual Property and Developing Countries, New York: Oxford University Press (2008).

B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Institutions and Technological Innovation During Early Economic Growth: Evidence from the Great Inventors of the United States, 1790-1930,” in Institutions, Development and Growth, (eds) Theo Eicher and Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa, MIT Press (2006): 123-158.

Abstract: Employing a sample of renowned U.S. inventors that combines biographical detail with information on the patents they received over their careers, we highlight the impact of early U.S. patent institutions in providing broad access to economic opportunity and in encouraging trade in new technological knowledge. Through setting low fees and establishing administrative procedures for application, the United States deliberately created a patent system that allowed a much wider range, in socioeconomic class terms, of technologically creative individuals to obtain property rights to their inventions than did European patent institutions. Moreover, by requiring that applications be examined for novelty by technical experts, and by enforcing patent rights strictly, the U.S. system reduced uncertainty about the validity of patent rights, and in that way lowered the cost of transacting in them. Creating secure assets in new technological knowledge and facilitating access to markets in technology in this way both stimulated specialization at invention and further enhanced the opportunities available to technologically creative individuals who would otherwise have lacked the capital to directly extract returns from their efforts. Indeed, we show that until the late 19th century, the ‘great inventors’ of the U.S. generally had backgrounds that permitted them only limited formal schooling, and made extensive use of their abilities under the patent system to extract returns from trading their patent rights. The usefulness of the 19th century U.S. patent system to inventors with humble origins may have implications for the design of intellectual property institutions in contemporary developing countries.

B. Zorina Khan, “Patent Laws and Intellectual Property Rights in World Trade,” in History of World Trade since 1450, eds J. J. McCusker et al., New York: Macmillan Reference (2006).

B. Zorina Khan, “Economic History of Patents and Patent Institutions,” in EH.Net Encyclopedia, (ed) Robert Whaples, 2006.

B. Zorina Khan, “Economic History of Copyrights in Europe and the United States,” in EH.Net Encyclopedia, (ed) Robert Whaples, 2006.

B. Zorina Khan, “Intellectual Property Rights,” in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, (eds) Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Blume, New York: Palgrave Macmillan (2006).

Abstract: The evolution of patents and copyrights followed different paths over time and across countries. Initially, intellectual property rules were endogenously determined according to social and economic priorities in each society. International patent laws subsequently were heavily influenced by early American policies that favored the rights of original inventors. By contrast, US copyrights were among the weakest in the world; international copyright laws converged towards European doctrines that were based on non-economic rationales for inherent authors’ rights. The intellectual property system in the 21st century therefore constitutes an anomaly, since previously no country simultaneously adhered to strong patent rights and strong copyrights.

B. Zorina Khan, “Intellectual Property and Economic Development,” Civil and Commercial Law Review of China, vol. 33 (April) 2005, (ed) Liang HuiXing. Translated into Chinese by Peng Xuelong.

B. Zorina Khan, “Le Piratage du Copyright par les Américains au XIXe siècle,” Economie Politique , vol. 22 (April) 2004: 53-73.

B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Institutions and Democratic Invention in 19th Century America: Evidence from “Great Inventors,” 1790-1930,” American Economic Review, vol. 94 (May) 2004: 395-401.

Abstract: Employing a sample of renowned U.S. inventors that combines biographical detail with information on the patents they received over their careers, we highlight the impact of early U.S. patent institutions in providing broad access to economic opportunity and in encouraging trade in new technological knowledge. Through setting low fees and establishing administrative procedures for application, the United States deliberately created a patent system that allowed a much wider range, in socioeconomic class terms, of technologically creative individuals to obtain property rights to their inventions than did European patent institutions. Moreover, by requiring that applications be examined for novelty by technical experts, and by enforcing patent rights strictly, the U.S. system reduced uncertainty about the validity of patent rights, and in that way lowered the cost of transacting in them. Creating secure assets in new technological knowledge and facilitating access to markets in technology in this way both stimulated specialization at invention and further enhanced the opportunities available to technologically creative individuals who would otherwise have lacked the capital to directly extract returns from their efforts. Indeed, we show that until the late 19th century, the ‘great inventors’ of the U.S. generally had backgrounds that permitted them only limited formal schooling, and made extensive use of their abilities under the patent system to extract returns from trading their patent rights. The usefulness of the 19th century U.S. patent system to inventors with humble origins may have implications for the design of intellectual property institutions in contemporary developing countries.

B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Lives of Invention: Patenting and Productivity among Great Inventors in the United States, 1790-1930,” Les archives de l’invention (eds) Marie-Sophie Corcy et al. (2004): 181-199.

B. Zorina Khan, “The Economics of Copyright and Democracy,” in Les chemins de la nouveauté, (eds.) Liliane Hillaire-Perez and Francoise Garcon, Presses Universitaires de Rennes (2003):247-267.

B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “The Early Development of Intellectual Property Institutions in the United States,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 15 (3) 2001: 233-246. Reprinted in Robert P. Merges (ed), Critical Concepts in Intellectual Property Law Series.

Abstract: The U.S. was a pioneer in establishing the world’s first modern intellectual property system. That system was distinguished by the provision of broad access to, and strict enforcement of, property rights in new inventions, coupled with the requirement of public disclosure, and it was effective at stimulating the growth of a market for technology and technical change more generally. Far from being static, fundamental modifications were introduced over time in response to changing circumstances. That such adjustments so often proved to be constructive owes partly to a private market being a central feature of the system, and partly to the democratic structure of U.S. institutions.

B. Zorina Khan, “Commerce and Cooperation: Litigation and Settlement of Civil Disputes on the Australian Frontier,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 60 (4) 2000:1088-1119.

Abstract: Does market expansion erode social bonds and depreciate social capital, as some have claimed? I examine the evolution of conflict and cooperation during economic growth by analyzing civil disputes in New South Wales between 1860 and 1900.  Market expansion is measured by the spread over time of access to railroad transportation. Disputes per capita fell over time and the proportion of cases settled before trial increased, but patterns varied across locations and types of disputes. Economic conflicts were likelier to be settled than personal disputes, and the fraction of cases settled was significantly lower in frontier areas and in districts without access to transportation. The results suggest that increased market exchange facilitates the development of informal rules and encourages transactors to find cooperative solutions through private bargaining.  In other words, as Adam Smith had point out, commerce promotes cooperation.

B. Zorina Khan, “`Not for Ornament’: Patenting Activity by Women Inventors,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 33 (2) Fall 2000: 159-195. (Lead article)

Abstract: Contrary to claims that nineteenth-century women did not contribute to inventive activity and that their work was insulated from technological progress, women inventors pursued profit opportunities.  Their patterns varied in much the same way as their male counterparts whose patent rates responded to market incentives. Women in rural and frontier regions were especially inventive, owing to the need to compensate for a lack of resources that were available to their urban peers. A random sample of assignment contracts indicates that the rate at which women commercialized inventions kept pace with patenting. The evidence indicates that nineteenth-century women were active participants in the market for technology, and suggests that the diffusion of household articles may have been more pervasive than previously thought.

B. Zorina Khan, “Federal Antitrust Agencies and Public Policy towards Patents and Innovation,” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, vol. 9 (Fall) 1999:133-169.

B. Zorina Khan, “Order with Law: Social Capital, Civil Litigation and Economic Development,” Australian Economic History Review, vol. 39 (3) 1999:172-190. (Lead non-editorial article)

Abstract: I use records on commercial litigation in New South Wales to assess the role of norms and social capital during economic development. The data indicate that total disputes fell over time, whereas the rate of out of court settlements increased. Litigation rates were initially higher in frontier areas that arguably needed to adapt institutions to new circumstances because norms and standards were as yet undeveloped. The fraction of settled cases was significantly lower in frontier areas and areas without market access. Patterns related to jury trials, plaintiff recovery rates, and attorney representation are also assessed. The results are consistent with the theory that cooperative solutions emerge as areas gain access to markets, and suggest that order and law are complementary inputs into the process of economic development.

B. Zorina Khan, “The Calculus of Enforcement: Legal and Economic Issues in Antitrust and Innovation,” Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Economic Growth, vol. 11 (1999): 155-201.

B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Patent Institutions, Industrial Organization and Early Technological Change: Britain and the United States, 1790-1850,” in Technological Revolutions in Europe, 1760-1860, eds. M. Berg and K. Bruland, Edward Elgar, London (1998): 292-313.

B. Zorina Khan, “Property Rights and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century America,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 55 (1) 1995: 58-97. (Runner-up Cole Prize, Best Paper in JEH; reprinted in Intellectual Property Law and History, ed. Steven Wilf, Farnham: Ashgate, 2012; reprinted in The History of Intellectual Property Law, ed. Oren Bracha: Elgar, 2018.)

Abstract: Economic development depends on the establishment of appropriate institutions, such as a patent system that defends property rights in inventions. Skeptics argue that patents in early America were unenforceable because judges arbitrarily ruled against patentees. I examine 795 patent cases to assess the role of the courts and find that judges protected patent rights because they believed that inventors were motivated by expected returns. Although changes occurred in the 1850s, the courts consistently upheld the view that the patent system fostered economic growth. If inventive activity indeed responded to material incentives, this finding implies that the legal system stimulated technical change by reinforcing the effectiveness of the patent system.

B. Zorina Khan, “Married Women’s Property Laws and Female Commercial Activity: Evidence from United States Patent Records, 1790-1895,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 56 (2) 1996: 356-88.

Abstract:  Nineteenth-century laws granted wives previously withheld rights to their own property and earnings as well as liability for debts and contracts. I use women’s patents to assess whether these laws encouraged greater female commercial activity. Patentees were motivated by potential profits and were responsive to market incentives. Women’s patenting jumped significantly in states with legal reforms and was lowest in states without such laws. Much of the subsequent increase occurred in metropolitan centers where property rights were of greater concern. Thus, by reducing transactions costs and increasing expected benefits, legal reforms stimulated women’s investments in patenting and the pursuit of profits in the market.

B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “`Schemes of Practical Utility’: Entrepreneurship and Innovation among `Great Inventors’ During Early American Industrialization, 1790-1865,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 53 (2) 1993: 289-307.

Abstract: The growth in inventive activity during early American industrialization is explored by examining the careers of 160 inventors credited with important technological discoveries. Analysis of biographical information and complete patent histories through 1865 indicates that these “great inventors” were entrepreneurial and responded systematically to market demand. Their inventions were procyclical and originated disproportionately from localities linked with extensive markets. Although unexceptional in terms of schooling or technical skills, they vigorously pursued the returns to their inventions, redirected their inventive activity to meet emerging needs, and were distinguished by high geographical mobility toward districts conducive to invention and its commercialization.

B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Entrepreneurship and Technological Change in Historical Perspective: A Study of Great Inventors During Early Industrialization,” Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Economic Growth, vol. 6 (1993): 37-66.

K. L. Sokoloff and B. Zorina Khan, “The Democratization of Invention during Early Industrialization: Evidence from the United States,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 50 (2) 1990: 363-78.

Abstract:  The skills and knowledge necessary for patentable invention during early American industrialization were widely dispersed among the general population. This
endowment permitted a rather elastic supply of patentable ideas over the relevant range as the expansion of markets induced more individuals to invent and innovate. Although a broadening of the ranks of patentees was primarily responsible for the initial acceleration of patenting, the importance of patentees with greater long-term investments in inventive activity increased during later stages of development.

Working Papers

B. Zorina Khan, Related Investing: Corporate Ownership and Capital Mobilization during Early Industrialization. NBER Working Paper No. 23052, January 2017.

Abstract: Scholars engage in extensive debate about the role of families and corporations in economic growth. Some propose that personal ties provide a mechanism for overcoming such transactions costs as asymmetrical information, while others regard familial connections as conduits for inefficiency, with the potential for nepotism, corruption and exploitation of other stakeholders. This empirical study is based on a unique panel dataset comprising all of the shareholders in a sample of early corporations, including information on such characteristics as gender, age, occupation, household composition, real estate holdings and personal wealth. Related investing was widespread among directors and elite shareholders, but was also pervasive among women and small shareholders. Personal ties were especially evident among ordinary investors in the newer, riskier ventures, and helped to ensure persistence in shareholding. “Outsider investors” were able to overcome a lack of experience and information by taking advantage of their own networks. The link between related investing and the concentration of ownership in these corporations suggests that this phenomenon was likely associated with a reduction in perceptions of risk, especially beneficial for capital mobilization in emerging ventures. These patterns are consistent with a more productive interpretation of related investing and its function in newly developing societies.

B. Zorina Khan, Designing Women: Technological Innovation and Creativity in Britain, France and the United States, 1750-1900. NBER Working Paper No. 23086, January 2017.

Abstract: Economic studies typically underestimate incremental changes in consumer goods and design innovations that enhance allocative efficiency and structural dynamics. This paper assesses over 12,000 innovations by female patentees and participants in industrial fairs and prize-granting institutions in Britain, France and the United States, compared to parallel samples of some 60,000 patented and unpatented innovations by men. These data uniquely allow for the systematic assessment of women’s creativity within the nonmarket household sector and outside the patent system. The analysis distinguishes between improvements in consumer final goods, changes in designs, and other forms of technological creativity. The results indicate that women, especially nonpatentees, were significantly more likely than men to be associated with innovations in consumer final goods and design-oriented products at the boundary of art and technology. Even those who did not commercialize their products or work outside the home pursued such improvements to benefit their families. The patterns suggest that framing women’s creativity in terms of a “gender difference” rather than a “gender gap” might yield useful analytical insights. A general implication is that, by inaccurately gauging consumer innovations within the household and in the market, economic research likely underestimates the extent of technological progress and advances in welfare.

B. Zorina Khan, Prestige and Profit: The Royal Society of Arts and Incentives for Innovation, 1750‐1850. NBER Working Paper No. 23042, January 2017.

Abstract: Debates have long centered around the relative merits of prizes and other incentives for technological innovation. Some economists have cited the experience of the prestigious Royal Society of Arts (RSA), which offered honorary and cash awards, as proof of the efficacy of innovation prizes. The Society initially was averse to patents and prohibited the award of prizes for patented inventions. This study examines data on several thousand of these inducement prizes, matched with patent records and biographical information about the applicants. The empirical analysis shows that inventors of items that were valuable in the marketplace typically chose to obtain patents and to bypass the prize system. Owing to such adverse selection, prizes were negatively related to subsequent areas of important technological discovery. The RSA ultimately became disillusioned with the prize system, which they recognized had done little to promote technological progress and industrialization. The Society acknowledged that its efforts had been “futile” because of its hostility to patents, and switched from offering inducement prizes towards lobbying for reforms to strengthen the patent system. The findings suggest some skepticism is warranted about claims regarding the role that elites and nonmarket-oriented institutions played in generating technological innovation and long-term economic development.

B. Zorina Khan, ‘To Have and Have Not’: Do Courts Favour Rich Litigious Plaintiffs? NBER Working Paper No. 20945, February 2015.

Abstract: A long-standing debate centers on the role of the “Haves” and the “Have Nots” in litigation. It is often suggested that wealthier plaintiffs are more likely to be repeat players, who tend to prevail in disputes before the courts. Do wealthy repeat players indeed capture courts and succeed in shaping legal rules regardless of the intent of policy makers? This paper employs a unique historical data set that allows a direct test of these hypotheses, including information on the wealth of participants in civil district courts, their occupations, and the total number of lawsuits filed by each litigant over a long period. The results show that repeat players indeed tended to be wealthier, in occupations that likely benefited from creating a reputation for uncooperative litigation strategies. However, outcomes in court were independent of wealth, and related more to the type of case. Far from being under the sway of the “Haves,” early courts functioned as an effective enforcement mechanism for extensive markets in debt, that likely promoted economic growth during this period.

B. Zorina Khan, Knowledge, Human Capital and Economic Development: Evidence from the British Industrial Revolution, 1750-1930. NBER Working Paper w20853, January 2015.

Abstract: Endogenous growth models raise fundamental questions about the nature of human creativity, and the sorts of resources, skills, and knowledge inputs that shift the frontier of technology and production possibilities. Many argue that the nature of early British industrialization supports the thesis that economic advances depend on specialized scientific training or the acquisition of costly human capital. This paper examines the contributions of different types of knowledge to British industrialization, by assessing the backgrounds, education and inventive activity of the major contributors to technological advances in Britain during the crucial period between 1750 and 1930. The results indicate that scientists, engineers or technicians were not well-represented among the British great inventors until very late in the nineteenth century. Instead, important discoveries and British industrial advances were achieved by individuals who exercised commonplace skills and entrepreneurial abilities to resolve perceived industrial problems. For developing countries today, the implications are that costly investments in specialized human capital resources might be less important than incentives for creativity, flexibility, and the ability to make incremental adjustments that can transform existing technologies into inventions that are appropriate for prevailing domestic conditions.

B. Zorina Khan, Of Time and Space: A Spatial Analysis of Knowledge Spillovers among Patented and Unpatented Innovations. NBER Working Paper No. w20732, December 2014.

Abstract: The paper explores the role of institutional mechanisms in generating technological knowledge spillovers. The estimation is over panel datasets of patent grants, and unpatented innovations that were submitted for prizes at the annual industrial fairs of the American Institute of New York, during the era of early industrial expansion. The first section tests the hypothesis of spatial autocorrelation in patenting and in the exhibited innovations. In keeping with the contract theory of patents, the procedure identifies high and statistically significant spatial autocorrelation in the sample of inventions that were patented, indicating the prevalence of geographical spillovers. By contrast, prize innovations were much less likely to be spatially dependent. The second part of the paper investigates whether unpatented innovations in a county were affected by patenting in contiguous or adjacent counties, and the analysis indicates that such spatial effects were large and significant. These results are consistent with the argument that patents enhance the diffusion of information for both patented and unpatented innovations, whereas prizes are less effective in generating external benefits from knowledge spillovers. I hypothesize that the difference partly owes to the design of patent institutions, which explicitly incorporate mechanisms for systematic recording, access, and dispersion of technical information.

B. Zorina Khan, Inventing in the Shadow of the Patent System: Evidence from 19th-Century Patents and Prizes for Technological Innovation. NBER Working Paper No. w20731, December 2014.

Abstract: Such institutions as patent systems cannot be well understood without an assessment of technological creativity in other contexts. Some have argued that prizes might offer superior alternatives to the award of property rights in inventions. Accordingly, this paper offers an empirical comparison of patents in relation to the award of prizes for technological innovation. The data set comprises a sample of patents, as well as exhibits and prizes at annual industrial fairs in Massachusetts over the course of the nineteenth century. The patterns shed light on the factors that influenced how specific inventions and inventors attempted to appropriate returns. Prizes in general provided valuable prospects for advertisements and commercialization, rather than inventive activity per se. Prize winners typically belonged to more privileged classes than the general population of patentees, as gauged by their wealth and occupational status. Moreover, the award of prizes tended to largely unpredictable, and was unrelated to such proxies for the productivity of the innovation as inventive capital or the commercial success of the invention. Prize-oriented institutions thus appear to be less systematic and not as market-oriented as patent systems. If inventors respond to expected returns, prizes may be less effective at inducing technological creativity.